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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background 
Referral of the inquiry 
1.1 On 5 March 2015, the Migration Amendment (Strengthening Biometrics 
Integrity) Bill 2015 (Bill) was introduced into the House of Representatives by 
the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Hon Peter Dutton MP 
(the minister).
1
 On the same day, the Senate referred the provisions of the Bill to the 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee (committee) for inquiry and 
report by 12 May 2015.
2
 
Conduct of the inquiry 
1.2  In accordance with usual practice, the committee advertised the inquiry on its 
website and wrote to a number of organisations and individual stakeholders inviting 
submissions by 9 April 2015. Details of the inquiry were placed on the committee's 
website at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate_legalcon. 
1.3 The committee received 18 submissions to this inquiry. The submissions are 
published on the committee's website and are listed at Appendix 1.  
1.4 The committee held a public hearing for this inquiry in Sydney on 
16 April 2015. Details of witnesses who gave evidence at the hearing are listed at 
Appendix 2.  
Acknowledgment 
1.5 The committee thanks those organisations and individuals who made 
submissions and appeared at the public hearing. 
Background 
The nature and use of biometric technology 
1.6 The field of biometrics relates to technologies that measure and analyse 
characteristics of the human body for identity authentication purposes. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill (EM) outlines the nature these 
technologies: 
A biometric (termed 'personal identifier' in the [Migration] Act), is a unique 
identifier that is based on individual physical characteristics, such as facial 
image, fingerprints and iris, which can be digitised into a biometric 
template for automated storage and checking.
3
  
                                              
1  House of Representatives Votes and Proceedings, 5 March 2015, p. 1177. 
2  Journals of the Senate, 5 March 2015, p. 2257. 
3  Explanatory Memorandum (EM), p. 1. 
2  
 
1.7 The minister detailed the role of biometrics in the migration context in his 
second reading speech to the Bill: 
Biometrics are an important integrity measure that contribute significantly 
to protecting Australia's border, and preventing the entry of persons who 
may threaten the Australian community. Once anchored to a person's 
biographic information, such as name, nationality and date of birth, a 
biometric adds significantly to the portfolio's capability to verify that a 
person is who they claim to be, and links an individual to security, law 
enforcement, and immigration information.
4
 
1.8 The collection of biometric information in the migration context in Australia 
has been increased several times in the last decade, as noted in the EM:  
The Department of Immigration and Border Protection's (the department) 
biometric programme has been progressively expanded over time, 
commencing in 2006 with collecting facial images and fingerprints of 
illegal foreign fishers, through to 2010, when the department commenced 
collecting facial images and fingerprints from offshore visa applicants in 
certain higher risk locations and onshore protection claimants, to 2012, 
when collecting facial images and fingerprints from non-citizens refused 
entry at Australia's international airports commenced.
5
 
Accuracy of biometric data 
1.9 The accuracy and fidelity of biometric data is a key issue in the context of 
using biometrics to positively identify individuals. The use of biometric identifiers 
does not provide an absolute assurance of the identity of an individual; as such, 
biometrics has been described as a 'probabilistic science'.
6
 A representative of the 
Biometrics Institute told the committee that generally, biometrics are around 
98-99 per cent accurate at the present time, however there are particular issues relating 
to the accuracy over time of biometric information obtained from minors.
7
  
1.10 The Minister noted in his Second Reading Speech that biometrics are 'more 
accurate than document based checks of biographic detail, such as name, date of birth 
and nationality because they are relatively stable over time and are significantly more 
difficult to forge'.
8
 
                                              
4  The Hon Peter Dutton MP, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, House of 
Representatives Hansard, 5 March 2015, p. 2131. 
5  EM, p. 1. 
6  Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 13, p. 2 (quoting the Science and Technology 
Committee of the UK House of Commons). See also Australian Privacy Foundation, 
Submission 9, [p. 6]. 
7  The Hon Terrence Aulich, Chair Privacy Experts Group, Biometrics Institute, 
Committee Hansard, 16 April 2015, p. 10. Issues relating to the accuracy of biometric data 
obtained from young people are discussed further in chapter 2 at paragraphs 2.34-2.35. 
8  The Hon Peter Dutton MP, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, House of 
Representatives Hansard, 5 March 2015, p. 2131. 
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Current legislative framework for collecting biometric information 
1.11 The Department of Immigration and Border Protection (department) noted in 
its submission that the Migration Act 1958 (Migration Act) currently contains eight 
separate sections which deal with the collection of personal identifiers from citizens 
and non-citizens, as follows: 
 section 40—circumstances for granting visas (applies to non-citizens); 
 section 46—valid visa application (applies to non-citizens); 
 section 166—persons entering Australia to present certain evidence of identity 
(applies to citizens and non-citizens); 
 section 170—certain persons to present evidence of identity (applies to 
citizens and non-citizens); 
 section 175—departing person to present certain evidence etc (applies to 
citizens and non-citizens); 
 section 188—lawful non-citizen to give evidence of being so (applies to non-
citizens and persons whom an officer reasonably suspects is a non-citizen); 
 section 192—detention of visa holders whose visas are liable for cancellation 
(applies to non-citizens); and 
 section 261AA—immigration detainees must provide personal identifiers 
(applies to non-citizens). 
1.12 The EM states that these provisions create a 'complicated legislative 
framework for when particular types of personal identifiers can be collected, 
dependent on the circumstance in which the personal identifier is required, and what 
power is being exercised'.
9
 
1.13 Some provisions in the Migration Act relating to the use of biometrics were 
amended in the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 
2014. These changes allow a clearance officer or an authorised system (for example, 
SmartGate and eGates in place at Australian border points) to collect and retain 
personal identifiers (specifically a photograph of the person's face and shoulders) of 
citizens and non-citizens who enter or depart Australia.
10
 
Purpose of the Bill 
1.14 The minister stated in his Second Reading Speech that the Bill would 
strengthen security at Australia's borders: 
The amendments to be made by this bill support changes introduced last 
year by the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) 
Act 2014. The Foreign fighters act, among other things, addressed the 
emerging threat of Australians seeking to travel overseas to fight with 
                                              
9  EM, p. 1. 
10  Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign 
Fighters) Bill 2014, p. 67. 
4  
 
terrorist organisations. Importantly in the context of this bill, it also 
enhanced the capability of the [department] to identify persons seeking to 
enter and depart Australia, and noncitizens who remain in Australia… 
Recent terrorism related events in Australia and globally serve to remind us 
that the threat of a domestic terrorist attack remains real. This bill further 
strengthens Australia's border protection measures by enhancing the 
capability of the department to identify persons seeking either to enter or 
depart Australia, and noncitizens who remain in Australia.
11
 
Overview of the Bill 
1.15 The Bill consists of several introductory clauses and one schedule containing 
amendments to the Migration Act 1958 (Migration act). The EM states that the Bill 
seeks to amend the Migration Act in order to 'implement a number of reforms which 
will consolidate and simplify the provisions relating to the collection of personal 
identifiers'.
12
 Further: 
[T]he amendments to the Migration Act to be made by this Bill will expand 
existing personal identifier collection capability, and provide for new 
capabilities, which will increase the integrity of identity, security, law 
enforcement and immigration checks of people seeking to enter and depart 
Australia, and of non-citizens who remain in Australia.
13
 
1.16 Specifically, the EM states that the proposed amendments to 
the Migration Act would:  
 streamline seven existing personal identifier collection powers into a broad, 
discretionary power to collect one or more personal identifiers from 
non-citizens, and citizens at the border, for the purposes of the Migration Act 
and the Migration Regulations 1994 (Migration Regulations);  
 provide flexibility on the types of personal identifiers (as defined in the 
existing legislation) that may be required, the circumstances in which they 
may be collected, and the places where they may be collected;  
 enable personal identifiers to be provided either by way of an identification 
test, or by another way specified by the minister or officer (such as a live scan 
of fingerprints on a handheld device);  
 enable personal identifiers to be required by the minister or an officer, either 
orally, in writing, or through an automated system, and allow for existing 
deemed receipt provisions in the Migration Act to apply in relation to requests 
in writing;  
 enable personal identifiers to be collected from minors and incapable persons 
for the purposes of the Migration Act and Migration Regulations under the 
                                              
11  The Hon Peter Dutton MP, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, House of 
Representatives Hansard, 5 March 2015, p. 2131. 
12  Explanatory Memorandum (EM), p. 1. 
13  EM, p. 2. 
 5 
 
new broad power without the need to obtain the consent, or require the 
presence of a parent, guardian or independent person during the collection of 
personal identifiers; and  
 omit provisions which are unused and no longer necessary.
14
 
Key provisions of the Bill 
Single broad collection power 
1.17 Item 34 of Schedule 1 of the Bill would insert proposed new section 257A 
into the Migration Act. This would introduce a single, broad power for the collection 
of personal identifiers by the minister or immigration officers, to replace the eight 
existing provisions dealing with the collection of personal identifiers in specified 
circumstances.  
1.18 Proposed new subsection 257A(1) provides that the minister or an officer may 
require a person to provide one or more personal identifiers for the purposes of the 
Migration Act or the Migration Regulations.
15
  
1.19 The EM includes a rationale for the collation of these powers into a single 
provision: 
The broad nature of new subsection 257A(1) reflects the policy intention 
that personal identifiers can be required from an individual or group of 
persons for any purpose under the Migration Act or the Migration 
Regulations. The intention is that the power to collect personal identifiers 
from persons should not be limited to particular circumstances, as is the 
situation under the current Migration Act. 
This flexibility in the Migration Act will enable the department to 
effectively and quickly collect personal identifiers in response to emergent 
risks based on individual circumstances, recent events, and detected or 
realised threats. This is more efficient and effective to enable the 
department to contribute to the national security effort in securing 
Australia's border and protecting the Australian community than the current 
piecemeal authorisations to collect personal identifiers that are currently in 
the Act that limit the department to collecting personal identifiers to 
particular circumstances and not others.
16
 
Types of persons from whom personal identifiers can be collected 
1.20 The EM details a non-exhaustive list of the types of persons who can be 
required to provide a personal identifier under proposed new section 257A, including: 
                                              
14  EM, p. 2. 
15  Proposed new subsection 257A(2) states that the purposes for which personal identifiers may 
be collected include those listed in subsection 5A(3) of the Migration Act; under subsection 
5A(3) a range of purposes are listed including authentication of an individual's identity, 
identifying persons who are of character or security concern, and combatting document and 
identity fraud. 
16  EM, p. 18. 
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 unauthorised maritime arrivals who have not lodged an application for a visa;  
 non-citizens who are applicants for temporary or permanent protection visas, 
or any other visa of a class that is designated as a class of humanitarian visas;  
 non-citizens who are applicants for any other class of visa created under the 
Migration Act or the Migration Regulations;  
 visa holders, who are the subject of identity fraud allegations; and 
 persons (citizens and non-citizens) at the border seeking to enter or depart 
Australia.
17
 
Types of personal identifiers that can be collected  
1.21 The EM states that a further purpose of proposed new subsection 257A(1) is 
'to ensure that any type of personal identifier, as defined in the Migration Act, can be 
required from a person'.
18
 The term 'personal identifier' is defined in subsection 5A(1) 
of the Migration Act as any of the following: 
 fingerprints or handprints of a person (including those taken using paper and 
ink or digital live scanning technologies);  
 a measurement of a person's height and weight;  
 a photograph or other image of a person's face and shoulders;  
 an audio or a video recording of a person (other than a video recording under 
section 261AJ);  
 an iris scan;  
 a person's signature; and  
 any other identifier prescribed by the regulations, other than an identifier the 
obtaining of which would involve the carrying out of an intimate forensic 
procedure within the meaning of section 23WA of the Crimes Act 1914. 
1.22 The EM notes that the department currently collects facial images, 
fingerprints and signatures. Further: 
The collection of fingerprints is currently limited to only some 
circumstances, and not others. The department's policy intention is that 
there should not be any limitations on the type of personal identifier, as 
defined in subsection 5A(1), which can be required from a person under the 
new section 257A.
19
 
                                              
17  EM, p. 18. 
18  EM, p. 19. 
19  EM, p. 19. 
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Means of collecting personal identifiers 
1.23 Proposed new subsection 257A(5) provides that, if a person is required to 
provide one or more personal identifiers under subsection 257A(1), those personal 
identifiers must be:  
(a) provided by way of one or more identification tests carried out by an 
authorised officer or an authorised system; or 
(b) if another way is specified by the minister or officer—provided in that 
specified way. 
1.24 In relation to proposed new paragraph 257A(5)(b), the EM states that this 
power may be used where it is not practical or efficient for personal identifiers to be 
provided by way of an identification test carried out by an authorised officer or 
system, for example where visa applicants reside in countries where the department 
does not have the capability to carry out identification tests.
20
 
1.25 The EM states that proposed new paragraph 257A(5)(b) is also envisaged to 
be used where personal identifiers can be obtained through a 'verification check': 
[A verification check] is an efficient, quick and non-intrusive method 
involving a scan of fingers using a mobile hand-held device at the border. 
In these circumstances, it is considered appropriate and efficient to be able 
to require a person to provide their personal identifiers other than by way of 
an identification test carried out by an authorised officer, which currently 
takes approximately 30 to 60 minutes to complete. 
1.26 The EM notes that the department has conducted verification checks of 
non-citizens on a voluntary basis at two Australian airports since 2012: 
The check involves a one-to-one check of fingerprints previously collected 
offshore as part of a visa application, on arrival at Perth and Melbourne 
airports. A mobile, hand-held device is used to scan fingers, which are then 
checked against the department‘s fingerprint data holdings. The identity of 
each passenger was verified in all cases. More than 10,000 checks have 
been conducted since the checks commenced in 2012. The same procedures 
and similar hand-held devices will be used in the future to conduct identity 
checks to be specified under new paragraph 257A(5)(b).
21
 
Collection of personal identifiers from minors 
1.27 Under current section 261AL of the Migration Act, individuals under the age 
of 15 must not be required to provide personal identifiers, other than a measurement 
of height and weight or a photograph of the person's face and shoulders. 
1.28 Item 48 of Schedule 1 of the Bill would alter this arrangement by amending 
section 261AL. Under these proposed changes, non-citizen minors under the age of 15 
in immigration detention will still only be required to provide height and weight 
                                              
20  EM, p. 21. 
21  EM, p. 21. 
8  
 
measurements or photographs, but for other minors under the age of 15, any personal 
identifiers available under the Migration Act would be able to be required.
22
  
1.29 By way of comparison, the EM notes that in the United Kingdom, the age of 
collecting fingerprints from minors is five years and above. Further:  
The department's intent is to set the age of collecting fingerprints in policy 
to allow for flexibility to determine when personal identifiers will be 
collected…The amendment to subsection 261AL(1) therefore reflects the 
intention behind the new section 257A [proposed by the Bill], that the 
power to collect personal identifiers is to be applied equally to all persons. 
Therefore, there is no exemption for minors in relation to the requirement to 
provide personal identifiers.
23
 
1.30 The Bill also proposes to alter the requirements in relation to the consent and 
presence of a parent or independent person for the collection of a personal identifier 
from a minor.  
1.31 Item 49 of Schedule 1 would remove the requirement for the consent of a 
parent, guardian or independent person in order for a non-citizen minor to provide a 
personal identifier in the limited circumstances in which this is currently required.
24
 
Item 50 of Schedule 1 would remove the requirement for a minor (regardless of 
whether they are a citizen) to have a parent, guardian or other independent person 
present while a personal identifier is being provided, except in the case of minors who 
are in immigration detention. The EM contains the following rationale for these 
proposed changes: 
[These] amendments…are primarily a child protection measure aimed at 
preventing child trafficking and/or smuggling. In addition, the amendments 
will ensure that the power to collect personal identifiers is consistent for all 
persons, and to provide flexibility for officers to respond effectively and 
quickly to emergent risks. The amendments will address situations where a 
parent, guardian or independent person may seek to frustrate the collection 
of personal identifiers by way of an identification test by leaving a room 
where an identification test is to take place.
25
  
1.32 The EM further states that the power to require a minor to provide a personal 
identifier without the consent or the presence of a parent, guardian or independent 
person 'is expected only to be utilised in limited circumstances'. It notes that the 
                                              
22  EM, p. 27. 
23  EM, p. 27. 
24  The department informed the committee that currently, the consent of a parent/guardian or 
independent person is not required when collecting personal identifiers from any minor at 
Australia's border on arrival or departure, or in transit from port-to-port. Under current 
subsection 261AL(2), the consent of a parent/guardian or independent guardian of a non-citizen 
minor is required in some other prescribed circumstances.  See: Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection, Responses to questions taken on notice at a public hearing on 16 April 2015 
(received 30 April 2015), [p. 9]; Migration Act 1958, Section 261AL. 
25  EM, p. 28. 
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consequence of a minor failing to comply with this request would depend on the 
circumstances; for example, 'in the context of a visa application, it could mean refusal 
of the minor's visa, or that their application for a visa is invalid'.
26
 
Collection of personal identifiers from 'incapable' persons 
1.33 Section 261AM of the Migration Act provides for the provision of personal 
identifiers by 'incapable' persons.
27
 Currently, an incapable person is not required to 
provide a personal identifier other than a measurement of height and weight or a 
photograph of the face and shoulders. Item 51 of Schedule 1 of the Bill would remove 
this restriction on the types of personal identifiers that can be collected, except for 
incapable persons who are in immigration detention. 
Requirements relating to consent and presence of a parent or independent person 
1.34 Subsection 261AM(2) of the Migration Act currently requires that for 
non-citizen incapable persons in limited circumstances, the consent of a parent, 
guardian or independent person must be given before a personal identifier can be 
provided. Subsection 261AM(4) provides that, for all incapable persons, a parent, 
guardian or independent person must be present when a personal identifier is 
provided. 
1.35 Item 52 of Schedule 1 of the Bill would repeal subsections 261AM(2) and (3), 
removing the consent requirements in relation to non-citizen incapable persons. 
Item 53 of Schedule 1 would amend subsection 261AM(4) to remove the requirement 
for a parent, guardian or independent to be present during the collection of personal 
identifiers from an incapable person, except in cases where the incapable person is in 
immigration detention. 
 
  
                                              
26  EM, p. 29. 
27  'Incapable person' is defined in subsection 5(1) of the Migration Act as ' a person who is 
incapable of understanding the general nature and effect of, and purposes of, a requirement to 
provide a personal identifier'. 
10  
 
 
  
 
Chapter 2 
Key Issues 
2.1 Submitters and witnesses to the inquiry raised various issues in relation to 
the Bill. Of primary interest were the implications of introducing a single broad 
collection power in relation to biometric data. The types of personal identifiers to be 
collected, the means of collection, and the storage and retention of biometric data 
were all discussed in detail, particularly in relation to possible impacts on individuals' 
privacy. Issues relating to the procedures for the collection of personal identifiers from 
minors, incapable persons and individuals seeking asylum in Australia were also 
raised. 
Introduction of a single, broad power for collecting personal identifiers 
2.2 Submitters noted that the new, broad collection power in proposed new 
section 257A would provide for a wider range of collection powers in several respects, 
compared with the current regime for the provision of personal identifiers under the 
Migration Act.
1
 
2.3 In relation to the purposes for which biometric data may be collected, 
Australian Lawyers for Human Rights (ALHR) noted that the Bill expands this from 
the 12 existing purposes listed in subsection 5A(3) of the Migration Act, to the 
broader ability of officers to require the provision of personal identifiers in relation to 
'the purposes of the Act and regulations'.
2
 
2.4 The Australian Privacy Commissioner, Mr Timothy Pilgrim PSM, noted in his 
submission that, in particular, this represents a significant expansion of the 
circumstances in which biometric information can be collected from non-citizens, 
which is currently limited to the following range of circumstances: for the purpose of 
granting a visa; when a non-citizen wishes to enter or depart Australia; to determine 
whether a non-citizen holds a valid visa; and for the purpose of detention decision-
making.
3
 The Privacy Commissioner stated:  
[It] is important to ensure that such a broad expansion of the power to 
collect biometric information from non-citizens is necessary and, further, 
that it is proportionate to the objective of enabling [the department] to 
ensure the integrity of Australia's migration programme.
4
 
2.5 ALHR argued that proposed new section 257A amounts to a 'broad, 
discretionary and unfettered power which is not limited in a proportional and 
legitimate manner', and recommended that 'the situations where biometric personal 
                                              
1  See, for example: Australian Lawyers for Human Rights, Submission 7, [p. 2]; Australian 
Privacy Foundation, p. 1; Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 13, p. 2. 
2  Submission 7, [p. 2]. 
3  Submission 12, p. 4. 
4  Submission 12, pp 4-5. 
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identifiers are allowed are categorised and limited; the situations when an 
identification test can be requested is also limited; and a limit is placed on how many 
times an identification test can be requested.
5
 
2.6 The Law Council of Australia (Law Council) expressed concern that some of 
the key parameters governing the collection of biometric information can be changed 
through the Migration Regulations rather than the Migration Act itself: 
The categories of biometric data, and the purposes for which it should be 
collected, will raise significant questions of policy and have substantial 
privacy implications. Given that citizens and noncitizens will be required to 
provide one or more personal identifiers that are sensitive information 
under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)…it is inappropriate for the types of 
biometric data to be prescribed by regulations.
6
 
2.7 The Law Council recommended that, in order to avoid ambiguity: 
[T]he Bill should exhaustively define the purposes for which personal 
identifiers are collected and the types of personal identifiers that may be 
collected. The power to prescribe these matters by way of regulation should 
be removed from the Bill.
7
 
2.8 The Privacy Commissioner agreed that the drafting of the Bill should be 
narrower in relation to the single collection power: 
[It] would appear that the proposed expansion of the power to collect 
biometric information from non-citizens may be broader than is necessary 
to enable DIBP to perform their functions under the Migration Act. 
…[To] minimise the privacy impacts of the Bill, any expansion of the 
existing power to collect biometric information from non-citizens should be 
drafted narrowly and limited to only what is necessary. Accordingly, 
I suggest that consideration be given to amending the Bill to clearly state 
the purposes for which this power is able to be exercised in the Act, rather 
than only referring generally to the purposes of the Migration Act and the 
Migration Regulations.
8
 
2.9 In relation to the purposes for which personal identifiers could be collected 
under proposed new subsection 257A(1), the Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection (department) stated that this would allow for the collection of personal 
identifiers in all of the circumstances currently authorised in the Migration Act, as 
well as 'provid[ing] flexibility to authorise collecting personal identifiers in 
circumstances that may arise in the future'.
9
  
                                              
5  Australian Lawyers for Human Rights, Submission 7, [p. 3]. 
6  Submission 10, p. 6. 
7  Submission 10, p. 8. 
8  Submission 12, p. 5. 
9  Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Responses to questions taken on notice at a 
public hearing on 16 April 2015 (received 30 April 2015), [p. 2]. 
 13 
 
2.10 On the question of the types of personal identifiers that can be collected, the 
department explained that the Bill does not alter the types of biometric data that can 
currently be collected under the Migration Act, and that if any additional types of 
personal identifiers were to be prescribed in the Migration Regulations (under existing 
paragraph 5A(1)(g) of the Migration Act), this regulation would still be subject to 
parliamentary scrutiny through the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and 
Ordinances and the regulation disallowance process.
10
 
Means of collecting personal identifiers 
2.11 Some submitters and witnesses raised concerns relating to the power under 
proposed new paragraph 257A(5)(b) for the minister or an officer to require that a 
personal identifier must be provided 'in a specified way' rather than through an 
identification test. The primary concern expressed was that this power would allow for 
personal identifiers to be collected in a way that bypasses the legislative safeguards 
currently in place (in sections 258E and 258F of the Migration Act) when personal 
identifiers are collected through identification tests. The Law Council stated: 
[T]he current system of safeguards applying to the collection of personal 
identifiers by means of an identification test, such as not involving the 
removal of more clothing than is necessary for carrying out the test and 
affording reasonable privacy to the person, will be able to be bypassed 
where an officer or the Minister authorises a different method of 
collection…The Bill should exhaustively define how personal identifiers 
must be provided rather than permitting the Minister or an officer to make 
such a determination.
11
 
2.12 The Privacy Commissioner noted that while the EM states this new power is 
only intended to be used in relation to the collection of fingerprints using mobile 
finger scanners, this restriction 'will apply in policy only'. The Privacy Commissioner 
concluded: 
[If] an amendment to the Migration Act that removes the requirement for 
personal identifiers to be collected using an identification test is found to be 
both necessary and proportionate to enable [the department] to perform its 
functions, this should be done in a way that minimises the impact on 
individual's privacy. Accordingly, I suggest that the restriction outlined in 
the [EM], that the discretion is only intended to be used in relation to the 
collection of fingerprints using mobile finger scanners, be included within 
the Bill itself.
12
 
                                              
10  Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Responses to questions taken on notice at a 
public hearing on 16 April 2015 (received 30 April 2015), [pp 2-3]. 
11  Submission 10, p. 7. See also: NSW Council for Civil Liberties, Submission 8, p. 4. 
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2.13 The Refugee Council of Australia argued that procedural safeguards currently 
in place in relation to identification tests should be retained for all collection of 
personal identifiers.
13
 
2.14 In relation to the means of collecting personal identifiers proposed under 
the Bill, the department noted that there are already some circumstances in 
the Migration Act under which personal identifiers may be collected by means other 
than an identification test, and that the Bill would: 
 continue to permit the current arrangements that apply to collection of 
personal identifiers offshore, but in a much less complex manner; 
 provide for more flexibility onshore to collect personal identifiers, particularly 
at Australia's borders; and 
 authorise the expansion of the current consent-based verification check 
procedure, which is already in use at Australia's borders in a limited way to 
verify identity and detect persons of concern.
14
 
2.15 The department also stated that policy guidance is issued to departmental staff 
about collection of biometric data in a way that complies with the Australian Privacy 
Principles (APPs), and that appropriate training is provided to staff to ensure that the 
implementation of the policy is compliant with the APPs.
15
 
2.16 Ms Rachel Noble PSM, Deputy Secretary of the department, further explained 
the context in which personal identifiers are likely to be taken at Australia's borders 
using the expanded power provided for in the Bill: 
At the moment, if we were to attempt to take a biometric of any person, in 
particular a fingerprint, the current act requires us to do that in a very 
narrow circumstance that is very strictly controlled and even, to some 
extent, locks us into ancient technology in order to do that. The act at the 
moment sets out a process that can take us up to an hour to take that 
biometric fingerprint—let's say—of any individual…[T]here is a process of 
needing to take that person into a private room, so that there is no-one else 
able to see what is happening, and seek their consent and other quite strict 
processes, if you like. 
This bill keeps that identification test—and that is the sort of language we 
use to describe that process—intact. It also says that we might be able to 
take those biometrics in other ways that the minister so determines. The 
practical effect of this new bill is it gives us more flexible processes by 
which we might be able to collect that biometric.
16
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2.17 Ms Philippa de Veau, General Counsel of the department, added: 
What is conceived at the moment is being able to use the powers that 
change and free up the manner in which personal identifiers might be 
collected. That is ultimately the intended outcome of the bill. That is, rather 
than having what we traditionally think of as a fingerprint test, when you 
and I log on to our mobile Apple phone, we may well use our thumb print 
to do so. The technology has evolved to the point of being able to verify 
quickly—without any humiliation, without any concerns—the identity of a 
person using that type of biometric.
17
 
Expected usage of the new broad collection power 
2.18 The Law Council noted that the new collection power has the potential to 
impact on the travel and privacy of citizens who may not be suspected of contravening 
an Australian law or posing a risk to national security. It argued that there should be a 
threshold test for requiring one or more personal identifiers from an individual only 
where an officer 'reasonably believes that the person has or will breach or potentially 
breach an Australian law or the individual may pose a threat to national security'.
18
 
2.19 In response to this argument, the department highlighted the fact that the 
existing collection powers in the Migration Act and Regulations 'do not require an 
officer to reasonably believe that an individual has or will potentially breach an 
Australian law or pose a threat to national security' before a requirement to provide 
personal identifiers is issued. The department further argued that implementing such a 
requirement would 'significantly put at risk the integrity of Australia's visa 
programme' by preventing the current practice of collecting personal identifiers from 
visa applicants in 23 higher risk countries in order to conduct identity checks as well 
as criminal, security and immigration history checks prior to the grant of a visa.
19
 
Adequacy of privacy safeguards in the Bill  
2.20 The Australian Privacy Foundation argued that the Bill does not contain 
sufficient safeguards protecting the privacy of individuals, with too many protections 
being reliant on policy rather than enshrined in the legislation itself: 
In terms of policy and legislation creep, concerns persist that many of the 
'safeguards' identified in the Bill and EM is situated as mere "policy intent". 
Given the lack of adequate protections in the legislation, the Bill is subject 
to mission-creep through ongoing policy expansions in the absence of 
adequate parliamentary oversight and public transparency…While the 
department does not intend to collect personal identifiers in all 
circumstances (such as fingerprints from non-citizens), the insistence that 
policy guidance will be given at a subsequent period excludes crucial detail 
from the legislation. As a result, insistence on "policy intent" through 
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post hoc regulatory developments leaves open significant possibility for 
mission-creep associated with the Bill. This is especially the case when 
considered alongside the compounding effects of technological 
advancements.
20
 
Privacy Impact Assessment in relation to the Bill 
2.21 Several submitters noted that, in its report on the 2014 'foreign fighters' 
legislation, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 
recommended that the government consult with the Australian Privacy Commissioner 
and 'conduct a privacy impact statement prior to proposing any future legislative 
amendments which would authorise the collection of additional bio-metric data such 
as fingerprints and iris scans'.
21
 
2.22 The Privacy Commissioner noted in his submission that a Privacy Impact 
Assessment (PIA) was being undertaken by the department in relation to the Bill: 
I welcome this as an important step in ensuring that the Bill appropriately 
balances the protection of privacy and the need to ensure that [the 
department] is able to perform its functions under the Migration Act. 
However, I would also strongly encourage [the department] to publish 
the PIA. Publishing the PIA would help give the Australian public 
confidence about whether the privacy impacts of the Bill, and any necessary 
safeguards, have been fully considered.
22
 
2.23 The department confirmed that it has completed a PIA in relation to the 
measures in the Bill, and stated that a copy would be provided to 
the Privacy Commissioner 'before the Parliament next sits'.
23
  
Storage and retention of biometric data 
2.24 Several submitters commented on whether the existing legislative framework 
governing the storage and retention of biometric information was sufficient to 
adequately protect the privacy of individuals whose personal identifier(s) have been 
collected.
24
 The Law Council stated: 
The collection of larger quantities and a broader range of biometric 
information create a risk that the data may be misused through unauthorised 
access and the risk of identity theft and fraud as a result of data breaches.
25
 
                                              
20  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 9, p. 3. See also Law Council of Australia, 
Submission 10, p. 23. 
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23  Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Responses to questions taken on notice at a 
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2.25 The Law Council referred to two recent breaches of data held by the 
department, and argued that the Bill should be amended to include a requirement for 
the mandatory encryption of any biometric data retained by the department.
26
 The 
Law Council also argued that current provisions allowing for the indefinite retention 
of certain identifying information should be removed, and that the issue of appropriate 
retention periods for biometric data more generally should be revisited through the 
Privacy Commissioner and public consultations.
27
 
2.26 In relation to issues surrounding the storage, retention and usage of biometric 
information, the department highlighted the fact that the Migration Act already has a 
framework for dealing with the storage, access and usage of biometric data: 
Part 4A of the Migration Act creates a series of rules and offences that 
govern the access, disclosure, modification and destruction of identifying 
information (including personal identifiers). These provisions will continue 
to apply to personal identifiers collected under the Bill… These provisions 
in Part 4A of the Act ensure the department complies with the requirements 
of [Australian Privacy Principle] 11 in relation to identifying information. 
That is, those provisions protect such information from misuse, interference 
and loss, and from unauthorised modification, access and disclosure.
28
 
2.27 The department also noted that the Privacy Commissioner is currently 
conducting a Privacy Assessment with regard to the collection, storage sharing and 
use of biometric data, to be completed by 30 June 2015.
29
 
Collection of biometric information from minors, 'incapable' persons and 
asylum seekers 
2.28 Submitters and witnesses raised various issues in relation to several specific 
groups of people likely to be affected by the changes in the Bill, namely minors, 
'incapable' persons and individuals seeking humanitarian visas in Australia. 
Collection of personal identifiers from minors 
2.29 Several submitters commented on the changes proposed in the Bill that would 
alter the types of personal identifiers able to be collected from minors under the age 
of 15 and remove the requirement for a parent or independent guardian to be present 
when personal identifiers are collected.
30
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2.30 The department outlined in its submission how the proposed changes to the 
Act dealing with requirements for minors under the age of 15 to provide personal 
identifiers are intended to operate in practice: 
 offshore: minors applying for a visa, as part of a family visa, from a country 
where facial images are already collected may also be required to provide 
fingerprints where there is a higher risk of trafficking; 
 onshore: 
 borders—all minors (citizens and non-citizens) will continue to be 
subject to existing border processing using a passport. In extreme 
circumstances, such as suspected child trafficking cases, a minor may 
also be subject to a verification check; 
 visa applicants—in addition to the collection of facial images, 
non-citizen minors may be subject to collection of fingerprints to 
conduct identity, security, law enforcement and immigration history 
checks; and 
 in detention: the existing provisions will continue to apply.
31
 
Rights of minors in relation to the collection of personal identifiers 
2.31 ALHR argued that the changes in relation to the collection of personal 
identifiers from minors are inconsistent with Australia's international obligations 
under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC): 
The amendments are said to be a child protection measure aimed at 
preventing child trafficking and/or smuggling. However…the proposed 
action is not consistent with the rights of unaccompanied children to be able 
to provide informed consent in relation to their own personal information. 
Creating a situation where unaccompanied children are required to provide 
information without any assistance is inconsistent with Australia's 
obligations under the CRC…Where a child is unable to consent, a guardian 
or parent is generally able to consent on behalf of the child. However, the 
current amendments make no provision for the requirement that an 
independent adult, guardian or independent observer be present which is in 
itself inconsistent with policy that an independent observer be present 
whenever an unaccompanied child is interviewed.
32
 
2.32 The Law Council expressed similar caution in relation to these provisions: 
The Law Council has concern that the provisions enabling officers to obtain 
biometric information from children without consent or without the 
presence of a parent, guardian or independent person may, in certain 
circumstances, not always be in the best interests of the child and have the 
potential to be inconsistent with recognised rights of children.
33
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2.33 In response to the concerns that specific guidelines should be developed in 
relation to obtaining biometric information from children, the department stated: 
The Migration Act authorises the collection of personal identifiers in a 
dignified and respectful manner. Use of force or other form of coercion to 
collect personal identifiers under the new broad power is not authorised 
under amendments in the Bill. 
The Department will implement additional policy guidelines that provide 
guidance to officers on how the new power to collect personal identifiers is 
to be exercised. The policy guidance will cover how personal identifiers are 
to be collected from minors and it will ensure that this is done in a 
respectful way. The policy guidance will be publicly available through the 
LEGENDcom database.
34
 
Accuracy of biometric information collected from young people 
2.34 The Hon Terrence Aulich, Chair of the Privacy Experts Group of the 
Biometrics Institute, informed the committee that there are particular issues in relation 
to the accuracy of biometric information collected from minors: 
[W]hen you are dealing with young people, virtually every form of 
biometrics has some form of difficulty. If it is fingerprints, a child's hand, as 
it grows, can widen the gap between the ridges and the valleys. That in 
itself can mainly create problems with registration at a later date, as 
opposed to enrolment, which is when you first have your biometric 
recorded. The difference between the original enrolment and the checking 
later on may be quite considerable, in which case there could be some false 
assumptions made by border authorities about a child over, let us say, a 
six-year period. In custody cases or other sensitive issues, that could create 
real problems.
35
 
2.35 Mr Aulich suggested that individuals who have information collected as 
minors should be able to access and verify that data at a later date: 
[The Biometrics Institute suggests] that anyone who wanted to check their 
file at a later date—let us say they are 18-plus—should have access to that 
file, and they should be able to test the reliability and accuracy of the 
biometric that was originally taken from them. Particularly if you are 
believing that a biometric taken from a five-year-old is going to be good 
enough for when they are 18, you may well be misleading yourself as an 
authority, and you may well be creating issues for that person at a later 
date.
36
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Collection of biometric data from 'incapable' persons 
2.36 The Law Council of Australia commented on the issue of obtaining consent 
from people assessed as 'incapable' for the purposes of the Migration Act:  
While the use of force to obtain personal identifiers is not permitted against 
an 'incapable person', [the Bill] is nonetheless silent on whether the consent 
of the 'incapable' person themselves is required. For example, a personal 
identifier could be collected without the knowledge of an incapable person. 
This is particularly concerning in light of the fact that the current criteria 
used to assess whether a person is 'incapable' is discretionary, i.e. that 
authorised officers must simply have reasonable grounds to believe that a 
person is incapable.
37
 
2.37 The Law Council recommended that consent must be sought from the 
incapable person themselves where a guardian or independent person is not available 
to provide that consent on their behalf, and that the government should ensure 
adequate support is given to incapable people so that they can exercise legal capacity 
on an equal basis with others by either agreeing to or abstaining from providing 
personal identifiers.
38
 
2.38 ALHR argued that the existing restrictions in the Migration Act on collecting 
biometric information from incapable persons are a necessary safeguard and should 
not be removed as proposed in the Bill.
39
  
2.39 In relation to the collection of personal identifiers from incapable persons, 
the EM to the Bill notes: 
Personal identifiers are very rarely collected from incapable persons. The 
policy intent is not to increase the collection of personal identifiers from 
such persons. Under policy, it is intended that personal identifiers are not to 
be required to be provided from incapable persons under the broad power in 
new section 257A…without the consent or presence of a parent, guardian or 
independent person, except in exceptional circumstances, such as 
intelligence that a particular person poses a higher risk.
40
 
Collection of biometric data from asylum seekers 
2.40 Some submitters raised concerns that individuals seeking asylum in Australia 
would be adversely affected by the changes proposed in the Bill. The Law Council 
stated: 
One form of personal identifier requested may be non-fraudulent or official 
documentation. This requirement may be particularly problematic for 
asylum seekers who may rely on fraudulent documentation to leave a 
country where they are subject to persecution by the State. 
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…[U]nder the Bill, the Minister may refuse a person a visa through 
section 40 or 46 of the Migration Act if the person refused to provide 
personal identifiers…[I]n addition to needing to resort to the use of false 
documentation to ensure safe passage to seek asylum, asylum seekers could 
fear what may be a reasonable request to provide identifiers due to their 
own experiences in their countries of origin. 
There is no indication of how such an issue would be resolved, and this 
could potentially lead to refoulement of asylum seekers, which is 
inconsistent with Australia's commitments under the Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees and international human rights law.
41
 
2.41 The Law Council also noted, however, that 'there are benefits of the use of 
biometric data in the context of asylum seekers', and that the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) uses biometrics for the purpose of 
safeguarding the identity of refugees on the basis that they often lose their identity 
documents during displacement.
42
 
2.42 The department advised that the Bill does not seek to amend the safeguards 
that apply to protections for asylum seekers and refugees in relation to disclosure of 
personal identifiers.
43
 
Committee view 
2.43 The committee considers that the collection of biometric information in the 
form of personal identifiers is an important tool in maintaining the integrity of 
Australia's borders and strengthening the ability of immigration officials to conduct 
identity and security checks of individuals. The committee is supportive of the overall 
intent of the Bill to simplify and streamline the provisions in the Migration Act 
dealing with the collection of personal identifiers. The committee has several specific 
comments in relation to the issues raised during the inquiry, as follows. 
Circumstances in which biometric data can be collected 
2.44 The committee notes that the new, single collection power provided for in 
proposed new section 257A of Bill does in some circumstances represent an 
expansion of the circumstances in which personal identifiers could be collected from 
individuals. The committee further notes the department's statement that the widening 
of the purposes for which biometric data can be collected would 'provide flexibility to 
authorise collecting personal identifiers in circumstances that may arise in the 
future'.
44
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2.45 In relation to the types of personal identifiers that may be collected, the 
committee accepts the department's argument that the Bill does not directly change the 
types of identifiers that may be collected, and that any new identifiers prescribed 
through the Migration Regulations (as can currently be done under the terms of the 
Migration Act) would still be subject to sufficient scrutiny as regulations disallowable 
by the Parliament.  
Means of collecting personal identifiers 
2.46 The committee acknowledges the concerns of some submitters in relation to 
the proposed new power for the minister or an officer to require a personal identifier 
to be provided in a way other than an identification test, particularly that the 
safeguards legislated in section 258E and 258F of the Migration Act would not be 
afforded in these circumstances. 
2.47 The committee urges that consideration be given to specifying in the 
regulatory scheme the basic safeguards that will be implemented in relation to the 
collection of personal identifiers under proposed new subsection 257(5)(b) of the Bill. 
These safeguards may include ensuring that the collection must: afford reasonable 
privacy to the person; not involve the removal of more clothing than is necessary for 
carrying out the test; and not be conducted in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner or 
a manner that fails to treat a person with humanity and respect for human dignity. 
2.48 The committee agrees with the department, however, that proposed new 
subsection 258(5)(b) would provide necessary flexibility for officers in the collection 
of personal identifiers. The committee does not consider, therefore, that this 
amendment should be scrapped altogether, as some submitters have suggested, but 
should be retained with some basic safeguards as outlined above. 
Recommendation 1 
2.49 The committee recommends that consideration be given to ensuring that 
protections in line with those found in sections 258E and 258F of the Migration 
Act 1958 apply to any means of collecting personal identifiers under proposed 
new paragraph 257A(5)(b) of the Bill. 
Privacy safeguards 
2.50 The committee considers that biometric data is sensitive and personal 
information, and that as such, its collection, storage and retention must only be 
conducted in such a way as to minimise the impact on the privacy of individuals. 
2.51 The committee welcomes the department's assurances that it complies with 
the requirements of the Privacy Act 1988 and the Archives Act 1983 in relation to the 
storage and retention of biometric information, in addition to the requirements in 
relation to these issues in the Migration Act itself. 
2.52 Further, the committee is pleased that the Privacy Commissioner is currently 
conducting a broad Privacy Assessment in relation to the overall arrangements for the 
collection, storage, sharing and use of biometric data, which will be finalised by 
30 June 2015. The committee trusts that any issues raised by the Privacy 
Commissioner will be duly considered by the government, and that any required 
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changes to current operating procedures and requirements will be implemented, 
including via further legislative amendments if necessary. 
2.53 In relation to the separate Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) conducted by the 
department in relation to the specific measures contained in this Bill, the committee 
notes the department's assurance that the PIA would be provided to 
the Privacy Commissioner at the latest by the May 2015 Parliamentary sitting period. 
As such, the committee expects that the commissioner now has the benefit of the PIA. 
In order to allay any privacy concerns in relation to the Bill, and further inform debate 
in the Senate, the committee considers that the PIA should be released publicly prior 
to the Bill's passage through Parliament. 
Recommendation 2 
2.54 The committee recommends that the Privacy Impact Assessment 
conducted in relation to the Bill is released publicly prior to the Senate's 
consideration of the Bill. 
Collection of biometric data from minors and 'incapable' persons 
2.55 The committee considers that the measures in the Bill designed to enhance the 
department's ability to collect biometric information from minors are warranted, given 
ongoing concerns in relation to human trafficking and the emerging threat of young 
people seeking to become involved in terrorist activities overseas. 
2.56 The committee also considers that the collection of personal identifiers from 
minors must be consistent with recognised rights of children and should not separate 
children from a parent or guardian unnecessarily; these issues should be adequately 
addressed in the department's policies and guidelines. 
2.57 The committee acknowledges that additional safeguards may be necessary in 
relation to the collection of personal information from children, particularly in light of 
the evidence from the Biometrics Institute that there are increased issues in relation to 
the accuracy of biometric information obtained from young people, in comparison 
with adults. The committee is of the view that the Privacy Commissioner should 
consider this issue further as part of the broad Privacy Assessment currently being 
conducted in relation to the collection, storage sharing and use of biometric data, 
scheduled to be completed by the end of June 2015. 
2.58 In relation to the collection of personal identifiers from incapable persons, the 
committee acknowledges the EM's statement that this rarely occurs, and that there are 
very few circumstances in which this would occur in the absence of a parent, guardian 
or independent person. The committee agrees with the Law Council that consent 
should be sought from the incapable person themselves where a guardian or 
independent person is not available to provide that consent on their behalf, and that 
adequate support should be given to incapable people so that they can exercise legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others. 
Collection of personal identifiers from individuals seeking asylum in Australia 
2.59 The committee considers that enhanced use of biometric identifiers has the 
potential to assist the department in confirming the identity of individuals seeking 
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humanitarian visas in Australia. The committee considers that departmental officials 
should undertake the collection and use of personal identifiers from these vulnerable 
individuals in accordance with the existing safeguards in the Migration Act (which are 
not proposed to be altered by the Bill), and in line with the UNHCR's guidelines on 
the use of biometric information. 
Recommendation 3 
2.60 The committee recommends that the Bill be passed, subject to the 
preceding recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
Senator the Hon Ian Macdonald 
Chair 
 
 
  
Labor Senators’ Dissenting Report 
Key Issues 
1.1 Labor Senators of the Committee note serious concerns regarding the 
Migration Amendment (Strengthening Biometrics Integrity) Bill 2015 in its current 
form.  
1.2 We argue that the bill lacks genuine independent oversight, and that the 
retention of and arbitrary collection of biometric information raises concerns from 
collection, and then subsequent use and retention.  
Issues pertaining to retention of and access to data collected 
1.3 Labor Senators would support a thorough review by the Privacy 
Commissioner, prior to passage of the bill, as to whether the current obligations to 
store biometric data securely are sufficient or whether increased security for the 
dataset is required, and support the recommendation of the majority report that a 
separate Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) conducted by the department in relation to 
the specific measures contained in this bill be undertaken and made publically 
available.  
1.4 We note evidence provided by Ms Ganopolsky regarding similar legislation 
passed in the United Kingdom: 
… the common thread is the fact that under the UK model, albeit it is in its 
early phases since introduction, the focus on the technical questions around 
the controls for handling biometric data seem quite pertinent. Hence, further 
assessment of that model seems to be warranted, in particular the questions 
about how information is retained, what discretions are given for the review 
period and what assumptions are made. The focus of much debate, 
including some case law arising out of the UK, was around the presumption 
that information would be retained indefinitely. And that has caused some 
concern with the Council of Europe; and hence the legislative response that 
you see in the UK. The subject matter of biometric data and how the UK 
has dealt with the framework is worthy of consideration.
1
 
1.5 It would appear from the evidence that the issue of indefinite biometric data 
retention has raised wide concern, and was as such addressed, particularly with regard 
to proportionality and the arbitrary nature of the retention. 
Safeguards for the collection of data from minors & vulnerable groups 
1.6 Labor Senators hold specific concerns around the lack of safeguards for 
minors and 'incapable' persons in the legislation, particularly that the consent or 
presence of a parent, guardian or independent person will not be required.  
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1.7 Submitters, including the Law Council, raised serious concerns on these 
matters, suggesting that: 
…safeguards should be implemented in terms of guidelines to make sure 
that biometric information that is collected is done so in a respectful 
manner, and also that an independent guardian be appointed for 
unaccompanied minors.
2
 
1.8 These concerns are echoed by the Labor Senators of the Committee. Balance 
must be ensured in the collection of data.  
1.9 We also note that the aforementioned UK legislation inserted specific 
protections for vulnerable groups,
3
 as such demonstrating that balance is possible 
when legislating for biometric data collection.  
1.10 In the hearing, particular issues were raised with regard to how the collection 
and retention of data could specifically be harmful to a child: 
Senator LINES: The example I was given was that there could be a custody 
matter between parents that involved a child, and that one of the ways you 
would identify that child is through biometrics. In the case of that child, 
when the child turns 18 and is no longer covered by the custody 
arrangement, are you suggesting that the biometrics for that child would 
then have this indefinite flag? 
Ms Ganopolsky: With the current model—potentially, yes.4 
1.11 Labor Senators also retain specific concerns that discretion will be decided by 
policy, and not proper parliamentary oversight: 
Ms Ganopolsky: It goes back to the comments that were made about 
arbitrary and non-discriminate powers with no threshold. It needs to be seen 
in the context of comments already made about the collection and then 
subsequent use and retention that flows from it. So things start at the 
collection point, and the absence of those controls at the collection point are 
in essence potentially magnified as the information keeps moving along the 
chain of its use. The majority of times it would be a legitimate use, but 
taking it back to the legal framework, the lack of threshold tests and the 
lack of subsequent protections of concern—which has already been 
outlined in the submissions and, I think, aired here— 
Mr Dunn: Absolutely. Mr Chair, we would presume that the department 
would implement some type of policy with respect to when that discretion 
would be used. I guess the concern that we would have in those restrictions 
not being in the legislation is that the policy could change at any time and 
the department's current good intentions may, at some time in the future, no 
longer be the case and they may have a very different intention or a 
different imperative. The concern is that legislatively it is unbounded and 
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3  Ms Olga Ganopolsky, Law Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, 16 April 2015, p. 3. 
4  Committee Hansard, 16 April 2015, p. 5. 
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that is a particular concern because it can change at any time without the 
scrutiny or oversight of parliament in that regard.
5
 
1.12 Particular concerns were raised in the hearing with regard to the indefinite 
period of retention of the data, where prima facie periods of retention with the ability 
for extension of retention times exist in similar legislation overseas.
6
 
1.13 The changes in the bill also stand in opposition to the recently amended 
Privacy Act, where tests must exit when retaining data that it be reasonable, and only 
retained for a period for which it is useful. With evidence given by the Law Council, 
in particular as it relates to the usefulness of retaining data collected from children, it 
would appear that the useful life of the data is not indefinite, as prescribed by the 
legislation.  
1.14 Whilst the majority report did note that the collection of personal identifiers 
from minors must be consistent with recognised rights of children, and noted that such 
issues would be addressed in the department's policies and guidelines, Labor Senators 
believe that only legislative measures will adequately provide the required safeguards.  
Lack of regulatory powers of the Privacy Commissioner 
1.15 Evidence presented by the Law Council of Australia highlighted the lack of 
regulatory powers of the Privacy Commissioner. Labor Senators support suggestions 
from Ms Ganopolsky of the Law Council, in that the matter has not yet been 
adequately tested, and therefore should warrant further investigation and consideration 
before legislation in this bill.
7
 
1.16 Labor Senators would welcome amendments to the bill that provide for 
additional security measures reflecting the sensitivity of the data collected, and would  
 
 
  
                                              
5  Ms Olga Ganopolsky and Mr Matthew Dunn, Law Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, 
16 April 2015, p. 7.  
6  Ms Olga Ganopolsky, Law Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, 16 April 2015, 
pp 2 and 5.  
7  Ms Olga Ganopolsky, Law Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, 16 April 2015, p. 2. 
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support amendments that address a requirement to notify the individual and the 
Privacy Commissioner for data breach notification in the event of a breach.  
Recommendation  
1.17 Whilst Labor Senators note that the Committee majority recommends 
that a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) be undertaken and made publically 
available before passage of the bill, we believe that the concerns of the Committee 
are best addressed as amendments to the legislation. 
1.18 As such, Labor Senators recommend that this Bill not be passed in its 
current form. 
 
Senator Catryna Bilyk   Senator Sue Lines 
Senator for Tasmania   Senator for Western Australia 
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